The Most Dangerous Move: Why Is It Harder to End the War After Blocking the Strait of Hormuz?

Original Author: Garrett

Original Compilation: Peggy, BlockBeats

Editor’s Note: On April 12th, after a 21-hour negotiation between the US and Iran broke down, Trump announced that the US Navy would blockade all vessels entering or exiting the Strait of Hormuz. Subsequently, the US Central Command confirmed that the measures would take effect at 10 AM EST on Monday, covering all Iranian ports and applying to all countries. At this moment, the world’s most crucial energy chokepoint underwent a transfer of power.

Tactically, this is a ‘smart’ operation: without needing to occupy or destroy, the US directly seized Iran’s most effective tool over the past six weeks—control over the Strait of Hormuz—and turned it into a means of reverse pressure. The blockade thus reset the narrative, allowing the US to regain the initiative.

However, this is not a war that can be ended by a single ‘smart move’. While weakening Iran’s revenue, the blockade also shrinks the negotiation space. When the chips available for exchange decrease, conflict is more likely to escalate.

The deeper change lies at the level of order. Over the past decades, the US built global trust in trade and energy systems based on ‘maintaining open sea lanes’; this time, it chose to actively close the passage. When the ‘gatekeeper’ begins to weaponize the sea lanes, the risk-pricing logic for markets and nations also changes.

Therefore, the blockade may alter short-term gains but is unlikely to touch the fundamental constraints of the conflict. A more probable outcome is a longer war of attrition and accumulating tail risks.

Below is the original text:

Trump ‘Captured’ the Strait of Hormuz.

Not by reaching a peace agreement, nor by reopening the sea lanes, but quite the opposite—he chose to blockade it himself.

On Sunday night, after the 21-hour negotiations in Islamabad failed, Trump posted on Truth Social: ‘Effective immediately, the United States Navy will initiate procedures to blockade all vessels attempting to enter or exit the Strait of Hormuz.’ The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) later confirmed: the measures will take effect at 10 AM EST on Monday, covering all Iranian ports, applicable to all countries without exception.

Thus, the world’s most critical energy chokepoint changed hands.

Over the past six weeks, the Strait of Hormuz had been Iran’s weapon. Tehran charged $2 million per vessel for passage, allowing allies through while blocking opponents. While neighboring countries’ exports plummeted by 80%, Iran earned $139 million daily from oil.

And now, this chokepoint is under the control of the US Navy.

This is Trump’s smartest tactical move in this war, but it is almost certain—it will not work.

The Transfer of a Weapon

There is a concept that accurately explains what just happened: the ‘chokepoint effect’. In a global network, whoever controls the key nodes holds the power to exert pressure on all participants dependent on it.

Before the war, the US was the guardian of the Strait of Hormuz. Since World War II, the US Navy has maintained the strait’s openness, allowing oil to flow and the global economy to function. This role formed the cornerstone of ‘Pax Americana’, which is why Southeast Asian nations trusted Washington’s ‘freedom of navigation’ operations in the South China Sea, and Gulf monarchies were willing to allocate their sovereign wealth into US Treasury bonds.

Iran rewrote these rules on February 28th. The moment US-Israeli airstrikes hit Iranian soil, Tehran chose to close the strait, but not completely—it was a selective, strategic control over passage. This 21-mile-wide waterway was transformed into the world’s most expensive ‘toll road’.

For these six weeks, Iran controlled this key node and thus possessed coercive power.

And Trump just took it back.

Compared to directly seizing Kharg Island (Iran’s oil export hub), this is a smarter choice. Theoretically, seized oil cargoes could be resold on the open market, excluding Tehran from its own revenue chain. The entire strategy can be summarized as: blockade, intercept, pressure.

On paper, the logic is clear: Iran earned more from the war than before it, while its neighbors bled. The only way to turn Iran’s economic advantage into a burden is to take away its ‘weapon’.

So, Trump did it.

Why This is a Brilliant Move

Objectively, this move is tactically brilliant in two aspects.

First, it reverses Iran’s economic structure.

Before the blockade, Iran exported about 1.7 million barrels of oil per day. Under wartime high oil prices, this meant $139 million in daily revenue, even higher than pre-war levels. Meanwhile, Iraq’s exports plummeted by 80%, and Saudi Arabia was forced to reroute through pipelines operating near full capacity.

In the entire Gulf region, Iran was almost the only oil-producing country continuously profiting from this war. If the blockade is enforced, this revenue will be directly reduced to zero.

Second, it is lower cost than invasion.

Choosing to seize Kharg Island would mean stationing ground troops long-term in hostile territory, within range of Iranian missiles. A maritime blockade allows for ‘remote operation’. Currently, the US military has deployed three carrier strike groups and over 18 missile destroyers in the region; the infrastructure is already in place.

So, this strategy seems almost flawless. But, don’t jump to conclusions yet.

The Real Change

Before discussing the problems, it’s necessary to see a change at a level higher than tactics.

Over the past six weeks, the US has been in a passive state. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, the US called for negotiations; Iran set passage fees, the US expressed dissatisfaction; Iran decided who could pass and who couldn’t, the US could only watch. The ceasefire framework was set by Iran, the negotiation location in Pakistan was Iran’s preference, and the ‘ten-point plan’ was Tehran’s initial conditions.

This blockade breaks that pattern.

Since February 28th, this is the first time Washington has proactively set the rules of engagement, rather than responding to Tehran. This point is more important than it seems.

Control over a ‘chokepoint’ is never just about who has ships on the water; more crucially, it’s about who the world believes is in control.

For the past six weeks, all shipping companies, insurance agencies, and oil traders priced risk based on one premise: Iran decided who could pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Starting at 10 AM EST on Monday, this ‘pricing anchor’ is completely flipped; decision-making power has returned to the US.

Whether there will be loopholes in the blockade (almost certainly) is a secondary issue. What truly matters is the reset of the narrative. 市場s, allies, and adversaries will readjust their behavior based on ‘who holds the initiative’. And at this moment, in this war, the initiative has returned to Washington for the first time.

This deserves serious consideration.

Over the past six weeks, the US looked more like a superpower that started a war but couldn’t control the situation. Each round of the ‘TACO cycle’—maximum pressure, temporary concession, nominal ‘ceasefire’—reinforced an impression: Trump was improvising, not advancing with a strategy.

This blockade is the first action that looks like ‘strategy’, not ‘reaction’. It’s also the first time the US is dictating the pace, not passively following.

This is not trivial.

In a conflict where ‘perception also determines the escalation path’, the initiative itself is a variable that affects markets. It changes how allies hedge, alters China’s calculus, and influences the debates within Tehran’s various factions about the next move.

But, holding the initiative does not equal winning the war. And the cost of this proactive move may be greater than the action itself.

Why It Won’t Work

The problem is actually simple: this blockade is premised on the idea that economic pressure will force Iran back to the negotiating table.

But in reality, it won’t.

Iran has 88 million people, a battle-hardened Revolutionary Guard, near-nuclear-threshold capabilities, and a proxy network spanning from Lebanon and Yemen to Iraq. This is not a regime that yields to economic pressure.

There are four reasons.

1. Iran Won’t Concede, It Will Escalate

Bloomberg Economics gave its judgment within hours of the news: Iran will view the blockade as an act of war. The so-called ‘two-week ceasefire’ is effectively void. Hardliners in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are likely to see attacking US vessels as an ‘irresistible option’.

The IRGC’s own statement confirms this: any military vessel approaching the Strait of Hormuz ‘under any pretext’ will be considered a violation of the ceasefire and ‘met with a severe response’. Supreme Leader Khamenei posted on Telegram: ‘Iran will usher in a new phase in the management of the Strait of Hormuz.’

This is not the language of a regime preparing to compromise.

2. China Won’t Let Iran Be ‘Strangled’

China imports 80% of Iran’s oil and cannot sit idly by while its key alternative crude source is ‘cut off’ by the US Navy. Bloomberg Economics points out the most direct countermeasure: China could leverage its dominance in the rare earth supply chain to pressure Washington.

China just helped broker the ceasefire agreement and has $270 billion in investments in the Middle East. What they least want to see is Trump controlling the distribution of global oil.

A more realistic assessment is: China will find ways to keep Iranian oil flowing, whether through shadow fleets, ship-to-ship transfers, or overland routes via Pakistan or Turkey. These methods have appeared in every previous round of sanctions against Iran.

The blockade will only increase difficulty, not stop the flow.

3. The Blockade Itself Has Loopholes

Even in the US Central Command’s statement, an ‘outlet’ was embedded.

The original text reads: ‘CENTCOM forces will not impede the freedom of navigation for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to or from non-Iranian ports.’ This means a Chinese tanker departing from an Omani port, passing through the Strait of Hormuz to Shanghai? It will not be intercepted.

The US is blockading Iranian ports, not the entire strait. This distinction is crucial. Iranian-linked vessels flying ‘flags of convenience’, loading at non-Iranian terminals, transshipping through third-party ports—these evasion paths exist.

Most countries’ oil exports are highly concentrated and easily targeted; Iran’s export system is more dispersed and has already been operating a ‘gray market’ system for six weeks.

4. The Escalation Ladder Works Both Ways

This point is the truly unsettling part. If the blockade really starts hurting Iran’s revenue, Tehran’s countermeasures extend far beyond the Strait of Hormuz.

The Red Sea direction. Iran’s Houthi forces in Yemen have already proven capable of disrupting the key chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea—the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. During 2023-24, Houthi attacks forced global shipping to detour around Africa. Bloomberg Economics warns: ‘The blockade could trigger Houthi actions in that region.’ And recently, Saudi Arabia just restarted its Red Sea oil pipeline, with extremely poor timing.

Gulf infrastructure. Iran has repeatedly struck energy facilities in the region. The 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq facility, using drones far cheaper than Patriot interceptor missiles, destroyed half of Saudi Arabia’s capacity. If Iran decides ‘no one can sell oil’, its tools are both cheap and mature.

Nuclear breakout. This was the core reason for the breakdown of negotiations. Vance stated that Iran refused to commit to not developing nuclear weapons. If Iran believes it will face economic encirclement regardless, accelerating towards nuclear weapons becomes a more attractive option.

The logic is cold but clear: a regime backed into a corner, with nothing left to lose, will not negotiate—it will escalate.

Paradox

For the market, what truly deserves attention is the reversal logic here.

The blockade was designed to speed up the end of the war by squeezing Iran’s economy. But the most likely result is the opposite—it will prolong the war because it removes Iran’s incentive to negotiate.

Before the blockade, Iran had both leverage (the Strait of Hormuz) and revenue (oil exports). It had the ability to negotiate and something to exchange.

After the blockade, Iran loses revenue but gains no new leverage. The Strait of Hormuz is no longer a resource it can bring to the table. Its remaining bargaining chips are only its nuclear program and proxy network.

But these two are things Tehran would never voluntarily give up. Diplomatic space has not expanded; it has shrunk.

There is an even deeper paradox.

By blockading the Strait of Hormuz, the US has effectively violated the principle it has upheld for the past 80 years.

To put it more directly: if the US can close the Strait of Hormuz when its own interests require it, what is stopping the Navy from taking another step forward in the South China Sea? And what is stopping other countries from following suit? The US did not ‘fail to keep the Strait of Hormuz open’; it actively chose to close it. These two are completely different, and the consequences of the former are far more profound.

In the past, the US was the ‘lock’; now, the US has become the ‘key’. Once the world sees that the nation responsible for guarding the sea lanes is also willing to weaponize them, this perception cannot be erased.

Four Scenarios

We don’t make predictions; we prepare. Next is the decision matrix for this game.

Scenario 1: Iran Concedes. Probability 10%, Oil Price $70–80, Observation signals: changes in IRGC leadership, restoration of direct communication channels within 72 hours, appearance of written statements on nuclear concessions;

Scenario 2: Prolonged Stalemate (Baseline Scenario). Probability 50%, Oil Price $95–120, Observation signals: loopholes appear in the blockade, China continues buying Iranian oil, oil prices remain high but don’t surge dramatically, war turns into ‘background noise’, cycle extends from weeks to months;

Scenario 3: Iran Escalates (Red Sea + Infrastructure Strikes). Probability 25%, Oil Price $150–200+, Observation signals: Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, strikes on Saudi/UAE energy infrastructure, acceleration of nuclear program, logic shifts to ‘if we can’t sell oil, then no one can’;

Scenario 4: Blockade Fails (TACO Pattern). Probability 15%, Oil Price $90–100, Observation signals: enforcement weakens within 1–2 weeks, Trump declares ‘phased victory’, negotiations restart but core issues remain unresolved.

Our baseline judgment is: Scenario 2—Prolonged Stalemate.

Iran will not concede because it cannot. Retreating on the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz issue is equivalent to regime suicide. China will maintain its economic lifeline through various workarounds. The blockade will only become an additional layer of pressure, not a decisive blow. Oil prices remain in the $95 to $120 range, the war continues to consume and drag on.

But for positioning, what’s more critical is: although Scenario 3 has only a 25% probability, it possesses 3 to 5 times the market impact of the baseline scenario. It is precisely this asymmetry that keeps us maintaining long positions in crude oil, gold, and the defense sector. The expected value of the tail scenario is higher than that of the baseline scenario.

Key Focus This Week

• Monday 10 AM EST: Blockade officially takes effect. Focus on the first 24-hour enforcement data—how many vessels are intercepted? Does China test the boundaries?
• Iran’s Response: The Revolutionary Guard has stated any approach will be considered a ceasefire violation. Monitor for drone or missile probes. The first substantive attack on a US military vessel will accelerate the evolution towards Scenario 3.
• Oil Market Open: Brent crude futures performance Sunday night. The gap-up magnitude will reflect the market’s judgment on the ‘authenticity’ of the blockade.
• China’s Moves: Does Beijing issue a public statement? Does it provide naval escorts for tankers? The activation pace of the ‘shadow fleet’ will be a key variable.
• IMF Spring Meetings (April 13–18): Global fiscal and central bank officials gather in Washington. What’s truly worth watching is the off-the-record exchanges—are countries coordinating a response or acting independently?

結論

Trump just made the smartest move in this war—he took away Iran’s ‘weapon’ and used it in reverse.

But ‘smart’ does not equal ‘effective’. This blockade will only work if all the following conditions are simultaneously met: Iran concedes under economic pressure, accepts US terms, abandons its nuclear program, and reopens the Strait of Hormuz according to Washington’s timetable.

But Iran will not concede. It has a proxy network spanning four countries, near-nuclear-threshold capabilities, the revolutionary national identity of 88 million people, and a China that will not sit by and watch it be strangled.

The more likely result is: the blockade becomes another phase in this war with no clear endgame. Oil prices remain high

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