Bloody Profit of $2.4 Million: These 9 Insider Addresses Know the US-Iran War Best

On May 18, Bubblemaps founder Nicolas Vaiman and Head of Investigations Deebs (a former US military officer, whose real name is withheld for security reasons) disclosed to the public that they had discovered nine highly correlated anonymous accounts on Polymarket. These accounts collectively netted over $2.4 million from prediction markets related to US military operations, boasting a win rate of 98%.

Bubblemaps provided a detailed analysis of these accounts on Twitter. They almost exclusively bet on military events related to the 2026 US-Iran conflict, placing their wagers with chilling precision—often days before key operations occurred, and favoring long-shot options with low odds.

This is not simply a case of being “lucky.” By visualizing trades on the Polymarket market “Will the US strike Iran before February 28?” using technology, Bubblemaps uncovered a massive pink cluster that had previously gone unmentioned on the X platform.

Further tracking allowed them to fully link the initial 4 accounts with another 5 through overlapping time windows, trade sizes, and fund flow paths. The fund flows of the nine accounts were highly consistent: funds were transferred from centralized exchanges to a shared wallet network within an extremely short timeframe, suggesting the use of professional services to conceal their tracks.

4 Core Accounts Each Earned $400,000

In the early hours of February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale joint offensive codenamed “Operation Epic Fury” and “Operation Lion’s Roar.” Over 12 hours, US and Israeli forces carried out nearly 900 strikes against Iran, targeting nuclear facilities, missile bases, military command centers, and hideouts of senior leaders. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, along with several family members and senior Revolutionary Guard commanders, were killed in the initial wave of strikes.

As early as the day of the strikes on February 28, Bubblemaps had publicly flagged six “fresh” accounts. Most of these accounts were created and funded within 24 hours before the strikes, precisely betting on “Will the US strike Iran before February 28?” They collectively netted approximately $1 million (some reports cite $1.2 million). At the time, the market odds were extremely low, yet these accounts took heavy positions. Bubblemaps described this as “suspected insider trading.”

Five months later, the nine-account cluster they discovered was larger in scale and boasted an even higher win rate.

The four core accounts were created a few days before February 28, each earning approximately $400,000; the subsequent five accounts were linked through fund flows and trading overlaps. The nine accounts placed over 80 bets in total, almost exclusively wagering on US military operations: the initial strike on February 28, the specific timing of Khamenei’s removal, ceasefire announcements, and more. They even spread bets across multiple dates to maximize returns, while occasionally placing a few small losing bets (e.g., on February 20), likely as a smokescreen.

Bubblemaps listed nine Polymarket wallet addresses (including 0x09d3273fa76282ce09f4f35a87d6f087c05f4e84) and emphasized that these accounts had long dominated the profit/loss leaderboards. The funds ultimately flowed into a shared wallet network, indicating traces of professional money laundering or service usage.

Vaiman stated bluntly, “Luck cannot explain these numbers.” Deebs added that there are numerous potential sources of insider information—government officials, military planners, intelligence analysts, and even military family members.

Earlier this year, US Army Sergeant Gannon Ken Van Dyke was charged with using classified intelligence to bet on a special operation in Venezuela on Polymarket. He invested $34,000, profited $400,000, quickly withdrew the funds, and attempted to delete his account. Polymarket cooperated fully with law enforcement, ultimately leading to the indictment. The Van Dyke case is considered a landmark example of insider trading in prediction markets.

In this instance, the nine-account cluster’s profit was six times greater, with a higher win rate, and was exclusively focused on US-Iran military events.

Bubblemaps shared its investigation exclusively with “60 Minutes.” The segment aired on the evening of May 17, attracting considerable attention. A CBS report noted that Polymarket has established AI monitoring and blockchain forensics systems to report suspicious activity to law enforcement, emphasizing that “insider trading is not welcome on the platform.”

As of press time, Bubblemaps has not directly linked the nine accounts to any specific entity or government department, merely stating that “the correlations and near-perfect win rate raise serious suspicions.”

Combating Insider Trading, and Copy-Trading Insider Trades

Insider trading creates a sense of unfairness for many market participants, prompting prediction market platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket to take more measures to combat it.

In late March of this year, Polymarket updated its market integrity rules for its DeFi platform and its US exchange regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The updated rules clarify three core types of prohibited insider trading behavior:

• Trading using stolen confidential information—if a participant possesses confidential information regarding the outcome or potential outcome of the underlying event, and using that information would violate a pre-existing duty of trust or confidentiality owed to another person or entity, the participant shall not trade in any contract.
• Prohibition on trading using illegally obtained inside information—participants shall not trade using confidential information provided to them by another person, if that information was provided by someone who owes a pre-existing duty of trust or confidentiality to another, and the participant knows or has reason to know that the person providing the information would themselves be prohibited from trading on it.
• Trading by persons capable of influencing the outcome—if a participant has sufficient authority or influence to affect the outcome of the underlying event, they shall not participate in trading any contract.

However, rules always have loopholes. Since it’s impossible to completely eliminate insider trading, some questionable “insider copy-trading projects” have also sparked controversy. These applications compile trading accounts with abnormally high win rates for users, or flag trades with suspicious timing or amounts, allowing users to copy these trades with one click.

Kreo markets itself as helping users “find insider traders earlier than others,” while Polycool directly posts a “Polymarket Insider Trading Guide” on its website, stating, “This isn’t the stock market; betting with non-public information won’t land you in jail. The rules for decentralized prediction markets are entirely different.”

A problem arises: is copying an insider trading address considered a violation?

Currently, there has been no official response.

However, so-called “insider copy-trading platforms” like PolyGUN and Polycule suffered hacker attacks this year, losing tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

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